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Abstract
We estimate the security of dictionary-based PINs (Personal Identification Numbers)
that a user selects from his/her memory without any additional aids. The estimates
take into account the distribution of words in source language. We use established
security metrics, such as entropy, guesswork, marginal guesswork and marginal success
rate. The metrics are evaluated for various scenarios – aimed at improving the security
of the produced PINs. In general, plain and straightforward construction of memory-
only dictionary PINs yields unsatisfactory results and more involved methods must be
used to produce secure PINs.
1 Introduction
A PIN is frequently used form of user authentication. The PIN is a fixed-length string of
digits, usually of length 4, 5 or 6. There are recommendations on how to choose and work
with the PINs in secure manner, e.g. [11, 15, 6]. Other proposals try to devise methods
for producing sufficiently secure PIN [7, 8]. Even though the users are often informed
and aware of PIN security, several studies showed that the significant portion of the users
choose weak, easily guessable PINs [2, 4]. Weaknesses can also lie in other aspects of using
authentication secrets, e.g. partial password/PIN verification [1].
One possibility of choosing and memorizing the PIN is to use so-called dictionary PIN.
Dictionary PIN is derived from a word with the mapping offered by numpads of ATMs,
mobile phones or Point-of-Sale terminals. The most commonly used letter to digit mapping
is the standard mapping shown in Figure 1.
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abc
3
def
1
5
jkl
6
mno
4
ghi
8
tuv
9
wxyz
7
pqrs
Figure 1: The standard mapping
Certainly, other mappings are possible, covering also digits 0 and 1. Recent study
of dictionary PINs [12] analyzed the security of dictionary PINs with respect to various
languages and dictionaries. It also described and assessed several methods of improving
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dictionary PINs selection. The assessment assumed uniform distribution of dictionary
words, see [12]:
“Let us stress that the experiments treat the words in a dictionary as equally
probable. This is certainly not true if a user chooses the word from his/her
memory. The uniform distribution can be easily achieved with the aid of an
application that offers random sets of words for the user to choose from.”
Nevertheless, sometimes it can be impractical to use an external application and some
users can hesitate to use or they would not even trust such application for PIN selection.
Therefore we focus on dictionary PINs that user selects from his/her memory, without any
external aid. We address the question of the security of such user-generated dictionary
PINs in this paper. The main findings of our experiments are the following:
− Considering uniform frequencies of dictionary words is inadequate for estimating the
security of memory-only selection of dictionary PINs.
− The straightforward word to PIN translation yields unacceptable marginal success
rates when frequencies are taken into account.
− Simple blacklisting, prefix, and two-dictionary methods offer only a moderate im-
provement in security metrics.
− A more demanding methods, such as morphing or combination of multiple methods,
are needed to obtain significantly better results.
1.1 Quantifying the predictability of PIN
Let N = 10n be the size of an PIN space, for PIN length n. Let X be a random variable
over the set {0, 1, . . . , 9}n. Let pi denotes the probability of choosing a particular PIN xi.
Without loss of generality we assume that PINs are sorted in the descending order of their
probabilities, i.e. p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pN .
Various measures for the PIN choices were proposed and studied, for details, discussions
and relations among these metrics see [3, 4, 16]. The most important ones are defined in
the following list.
− Shannon entropy, expressed in bits, measures the uncertainty in a random variable:
H1(X) = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2 pi.
− The guesswork measures the expected number of guesses needed to find a PIN, trying
in descending order according their probability:
G(X) =
N∑
i=1
i · pi.
− The marginal guesswork measures the expected number of guesses needed to increase
the success probability of finding the PIN to at least α (usually α = 0.5):
µα(X) = min{1 ≤ k ≤ N |∑ki=1 pi ≥ α}.
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− The marginal success rate measures the probability of guessing the PIN given β
attempts (β is usually 3 or 6):
λβ =
β∑
i=1
pi.
Since the guesswork and the marginal guesswork are not directly comparable to Shannon
entropy, the values of G(X) and µα(X) are converted into bits using the following formulas
[3]: G˜(X) = log2(2G(X)− 1), µ˜α(X) = log2(µα(X)/λµα).
Since the standard mapping does not cover digits 0 and 1, the ideal security metrics
have the following values for dictionary PINs (assuming uniform distribution of PINs) :
− PIN length 4: H1(X) = G˜(X) = µ˜0.5 = 12.00 bits, λ6(X) = 0.15%,
− PIN length 5: H1(X) = G˜(X) = µ˜0.5 = 15.00 bits, λ6(X) = 0.02%.
2 Estimating metrics for dictionary PIN selection
In order to model frequency distribution of words in a language we use frequency lists
based on subtitles. This is a respected method for analyzing contemporary languages
[5]. We use two frequency lists for English – a carefully prepared SUBTLEXus [13]
containing 60,384 words with a frequency higher than 1, and the list compiled from
subtitles available from opensubtitles.org [10], containing more than 450,000 words (even
words with frequency 1). We will denote the results obtained using the first/second list
with label “SUBTLEXus”/“opensub”, respectively.
2.1 Basic statistics
We compare the metrics for straightforward translation of words to PINs using the standard
mapping, see Figure 1, with results obtained in [12]. We consider only the words with the
length equal to the PIN length n. The translation starts with stripping the diacritical
marks, if they are present. Then, the word is mapped to PIN using the standard mapping,
e.g. “love” and “hate” yield 5683 and 4283, respectively. The frequency of particular word
contributes to the probability of resulting PIN.
The results for the PIN lengths 4 and 5 are shown in Table 1. The columns labeled
“uniform” contain results for PINs derived from a large (spell-checker) English dictionary
assuming uniform frequencies of words [12]. The columns labeled “RockYou” contains
results for PINs derived from RockYou password database where frequencies of words
(passwords) were taken into account. It is easy to notice a striking difference between
scenarios that consider the frequencies of words and those that do not.
A closer look at the most frequent dictionary PINs from SUBTLEXus and opensub
reveals the following observations:
− PIN length 4: Top 7 PINs share the same spots in SUBTLEXus and opensub scenarios
(the last three spots in top 10 are just permuted, i.e. the top 10 contains exactly the
same set of PINs in both scenarios). The high marginal success rates are caused by
the frequencies of the following PINs: 8428 (probability 6.65% based on SUBTLEXus,
e.g. produced from the word “that”), 9428 (4.64%, “what”), 8447 (3.76%, “this”),
4283 (3.14%, “have”), 9687 (3.04%, “your”), and 5669 (2.70%, “know”).
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SUBTLEXus opensub uniform [12] RockYou [12]
n = 4 n = 5 n = 4 n = 5 n = 4 n = 5 n = 4 n = 5
H1 (bits) 7.23 8.42 7.42 8.88 11.28 13.37 − −
G˜ (bits) 7.18 8.63 7.49 9.45 10.94 13.08 − −
µ˜0.5 (bits) 5.52 6.58 5.64 6.92 10.61 12.68 9.20 10.76
λ6 (%) 23.93 19.24 22.80 17.34 0.85 0.33 10.81 8.46
Table 1: Comparison of metrics for straightforward construction of dictionary PINs
− PIN length 5: The sets of top 10 PINs differ in just two PINs, while the first 5
spots are exactly the same in SUBTLEXus and opensub scenarios. For SUBTLEXus
scenario the most frequent PINs are: 84373 (5.12%, e.g. produced from the word
“there”), 74448 (3.95%, “right”), 22688 (3.54%, “about”), 84465 (2.62%, “think”),
46464 (2.07%, “going”), and 46662 (1.94%, “gonna”).
We can conclude that considering uniform frequencies of dictionary words is inadequate
for estimating the security of memory-only selection of dictionary PIN. The results show
the deficiency of such PINs clearly – the marginal success rates are unacceptable. Moreover,
it seems that this strategy is worse (in average) than strategies currently employed by
users. In order to compare memory-only dictionary PINs with “common” PIN selection
strategies, we present estimates of PIN metrics based on RockYou password database and
iPhone unlock codes [4] in Table 2. On the other hand, the lack of digits 0 and 1 in the
standard mapping ensures that these digits do not appear in the resulting PIN. Therefore
the PINs that are often blacklisted, e.g. 0000, 1111 or 1234, or those the users are warned
not to use, e.g. birthday or anniversary years, cannot be selected this way.
RockYou iPhone
H1 (bits) 10.74 11.42
G˜ (bits) 11.50 11.83
µ˜0.5 (bits) 9.11 10.37
λ6 (%) 12.29 12.39
Table 2: Estimation of PIN metrics (PIN length 4) [4]
We explore few possibilities for improving memory-only dictionary PINs in the following
sections.
2.2 Blacklisting
Blacklisting is a common method for improving the security of user-selected PINs. Even
if not strictly enforced (by forbidding the selection of some PINs), at least there are
recommendations what PINs a user should not choose, e.g. see [15]:
“Select a PIN that cannot be easily guessed (i.e., do not use birth date, partial
account numbers, sequential numbers like 1234, or repeated values such as
1111).”
4
There are two possibilities for blacklisting in dictionary PIN scenario: first, blacklisting
the most frequent words; and second, blacklisting the most frequent PINs. The PIN
blacklisting is easier to enforce in practice, and the values of security metrics are comparable
for both approaches. Figure 2 shows the entropy and the marginal success rate (λ6) for
PIN blacklisting (based on SUBTLELXus) ranging from 0 to 100 blacklisted PINs. The
results show only a moderate improvement in security metrics, therefore blacklisting alone
is not a satisfactory method for improving memory-only dictionary PINs.
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Figure 2: The effect of PIN blacklisting on entropy and marginal success rate
2.3 Modifications of PIN construction
In order to improve the security metrics of resulting PIN, some natural modifications to
basic translation of dictionary word to PIN were proposed in [12]. We evaluate these
modifications when applied to our “frequency-aware” experiments:
− Stretched mapping – in order to cover digits 0 and 1, we can stretch the standard
mapping. Our estimates for this modification use the following mapping: a, b 7→ 1;
c, d 7→ 2; e, f 7→ 3; g, h, i 7→ 4; j, k, l 7→ 5; m, n 7→ 6; o, p, q 7→ 7; r, s, t 7→ 8; u, v, w
7→ 9; x, y, z 7→ 0.
− Prefix – instead of taking just words with the desired PIN length, i.e. n, we use any
word with the length greater or equal to n and we use its prefix for translation to
PIN.
− Morphing – the standard word to PIN translation is enriched by random change of
one character. Assuming that user can choose a random position in a word/PIN
and a random digit, the resulting PIN is formed by replacing this position by the
chosen digit. For example “this” can be translated to “t1is”/8147, “0his”/0447,
“thi9”/8449, etc. Certainly, this method is more demanding than the straightforward
use of dictionary words. Our estimates assume uniform distribution of positions and
digits for this method.
The results for all above methods are presented in Table 3. The stretched mapping
yields no improvement at all – the most frequent PINs changed their values, but their
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frequencies remained almost unchanged. The prefix method offers a moderate improvement
in security metrics. Obviously, the morphing is the most successful approach by a wide
margin.
Stretched map. Prefix Morphing
n = 4 n = 5 n = 4 n = 5 n = 4 n = 5
H1 (bits) 7.28 8.43 9.03 10.36 11.08 12.96
G˜ (bits) 7.28 8.67 8.89 10.39 10.73 12.84
µ˜0.5 (bits) 5.52 6.58 7.56 8.77 9.88 11.53
λ6 (%) 24.04 19.31 11.30 8.01 2.77 2.17
Table 3: Modifications of PIN constructions – results based on SUBTLEXus
Comparing these results with the estimates from Table 2, we can notice that the prefix
method for dictionary PINs offers slightly better marginal success rate but worse entropy,
guesswork and marginal guesswork. An interesting observation is that the morphing offers
much better marginal success rate while keeping other security metrics comparable to
real-word estimates from Table 2.
Interestingly, the prefix method and the morphing yield better results than the estimates
of PIN entropy by NIST [9]: 9 and 10 bits for PIN lengths 4 and 5, respectively. On the
other hand, plain memory-only dictionary PINs offer less entropy than these estimates.
2.4 Blacklisting the prefix and the morphing methods
We expect that blacklisting of the most frequent PINs can further improve the security
metrics of promising methods from the previous section (i.e. prefix and morphing methods).
Indeed, our experiments confirm this expectation. Table 4 shows the values of the entropy
and the marginal success rate for various sizes of the blacklist (0, 10, and 20).
Prefix Morphing
blacklist n = 4 n = 5 n = 4 n = 5
H1 (bits) 0 9.03 10.36 11.08 12.96
10 9.37 10.68 11.15 13.06
20 9.53 10.82 11.19 13.09
λ6 (%) 0 11.30 8.01 2.77 2.17
10 6.62 4.28 1.74 0.97
20 4.69 2.95 1.56 0.85
Table 4: Combination of PIN blacklist and the prefix/morphing method
The blacklisting substantially improves the marginal success rate, but offers only
a moderate improvement of the entropy. A disadvantage of the blacklisting is that it
complicates the implementation of authentication.
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2.5 Two-dictionary PINs
Many people know more than one language. In such case, it is easy to adopt a strategy where
a user randomly choses a language and then (s)he selects a word for PIN construction.
We expect obviously an improvement in security metrics values. In order to assess
the improvement we use English and Dutch frequency dictionaries SUBTLEXus and
SUBTLEXnl [14]. We use words with frequency above 1 in both dictionaries, and we
assume that the user selects the dictionary with probability 1/2. The results for this
two-dictionary scenario are shown in Table 5, where “basic” denotes the construction using
words with the length n, “prefix” denotes the prefix method, and “prefix (BL)” denotes
the combination of the prefix method with the blacklist of the length 10.
Basic Prefix Prefix (BL 10)
n = 4 n = 5 n = 4 n = 5 n = 4 n = 5
H1 (bits) 7.84 9.35 9.62 11.21 9.84 11.37
G˜ (bits) 7.72 9.41 9.37 11.09 9.50 11.17
µ˜0.5 (bits) 6.24 7.63 8.27 9.68 8.55 9.85
λ6 (%) 18.00 11.07 7.78 4.37 4.09 2.32
Table 5: Security metrics for two-dictionary scenario
As expected, the results are better than results for corresponding single-dictionary
scenario methods. However, even with the blacklisting the results cannot match the
morphing method results for single dictionary.
3 Conclusion
We analyzed the security of memory-only selection of dictionary PINs. The results show
that plain construction of dictionary PINs is unsatisfactory and more involved methods
should be used for improved security metrics.
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